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Highlights
• Is the potential for total systemic failure something that we should be
actively concerned about?
• Complexity theory and complex networks should be part of the method-
ological tool kit that we use to model and understand the Anthropocene.




While the world argues about whether climate change is real, what
if all systems are failing? This paper seeks to ignite further discussion
concerning human impact on all aspects of our environment as we move
further into the Anthropocene. Both in terms of the pressure we produce,
but also how our activity changes the nature of the relationships between
Earth’s systems. The paper suggests that we currently lack the tools and
analytical capacity to understand the significance of these changes and
therefore we cannot answer the question,“are all systems failing?”. We
discuss how complexity theory, complex networks, and Artificial Intelli-
gence, could contribute part of a solution.
Keywords: complexity, networks, systemic, failure, Anthropocene, artificial
intelligence
1 Introduction
Helbing[26] proposed the establishment of a Global Systems Science as a re-
sponse to the problems of instability in our highly connected world. This pro-
posal was partly in recognition that there needs to be greater focus on the
consequences of increasing connectivity between (and perhaps within) systems
for the stability of the global system-of-systems that is our environment. These
real-world complex adaptive systems often display resilience to, and the ability
to adapt to, internal change and external drivers [23, 50]. However, what we
do not know is how far these systems can be pushed before they either rad-
ically shift (into a perhaps unrecognisable state), or fail altogether, although
some work has started to try to address, or at least draw attention to this is-
sue [12, 13, 10, 28, 33, 6]. We lack sufficient knowledge in a number of key areas,
including the extent to which global systems are threatened, the degree to which
systems are inter-dependent and connected, and significantly how this complex
network of systems will respond to change or failure in connecting systems. We
lack detailed understanding of the nature or character of the connections be-
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tween and within systems, and therefore the significance of their loss is also
unknown. Put simply our systemic understanding of the world needs improve-
ment if we are to understand the consequences of the changes that mark the
Anthropocene.
If we accept that we live in a global system-of-systems, where it is not
unreasonable to suggest that feedbacks exist within and between all systems
that have a significant role in the security of human civilisation, abandoning any
possibility that the global environment is a set of discrete systems. We have to
accept that changes or failures in one system feedback into the other systems;
that all systems are intimately connected in ways that we currently do not fully
understand [11, 26]. For global systems that are increasingly under pressure
from human activity, what are the potential consequences of this connectivity
and feedback for system stability, and what are the consequences of our lack of
knowledge of how systems respond to internal dynamics and external drivers to
our understanding of how systems might fail in the real world? This paper seeks
to promote discussion of these problems, and will explore the possibility that
human civilisation could undergo total systemic failure. Failure that could in
part be due to the connectivity in global systems. Lack of knowledge means that
we do not know if this failure is inevitable and already happening (perhaps on a
temporal scale what we are not sensitive to), or if the global system-of-systems
will prove resilient. Perhaps most likely, and therefore most importantly, our
future security as a species will require significant changes in our behaviour,
and interventions in global systems. Knowing how and where to make those
interventions is essential.
2 Complex Adaptive Systems, Networks, and
Chaos
One definition of a system as a set of elements or objects that act together
as part of a process or mechanism [47], or form part of an network [7]. For
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example the financial system is the result of the interactions of a set of financial
organisations, such as banks, hedge funds, and regulators. The complexity
comes in the form of the difficulty (or potential impossibility) of predicting
how that system will behave by looking at the interactions (or relationships)
of the parts alone. We may think that we understand the types of interactions
occurring between the banks, hedge funds, and regulators for example. However,
complexity theory shows us that this is not enough to predict the behaviour of
the financial system. Simple interactions between the parts of a complex system
can result in emergent behaviours [21], a property elegantly demonstrated by
Conway’s Game of Life (for description see [44]). The global behaviour of the
system is often referred to as its state, and we talk about systems changing
state and therefore changing behaviour. Complex systems are able to adapt to
changing external inputs from their environment, the parts can change the way
they interact with each other, and the parts themselves can also change, without
there necessarily being a significant change in the emergent global behaviour or
system state [27].
Unfortunately we cannot yet predict or measure how much change would
equate to a perceptibly different system. A system could go through a slow and
smooth transition over a period of time long enough that the systems around it
adapt in the same way, and to us (with our short memories) they might fail to
register as different. Alternatively a system could shift rapidly, causing a ma-
jor disruption; a tipping point [10, 6]. Whether or not a tipping point is more
significant than slow evolution of a system is debatable. A slow and gradual
change into a hostile state still brings you to that hostile sate, and slowness is
merely a question of relative scale. Our obsession with rapid changes is more
down to our relatively short-term outlook as a species, or a consequence of the
shortness of our individual lifespans when compared with changes in the envi-
ronment. If the result is a hostile environment we should be as concerned about
slow systemic shifts as we are tipping points. Given time all state changes are
significant to humans as a population, be they tipping point failures, collapse,
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or slow and relentless shift. The main differences being that if the change is
slow and gradual it might be easier to reverse the change and steer the system
back towards a more advantageous state.
This notion of changing of state is perhaps in itself problematic. To talk
of maintaining a particular state, or one state being advantageous to another,
makes sense from the view of a particular element of that system (i.e. humans),
but does not really mean very much from position of the system as a whole.
There is no central evaluator that has an opinion on the value of the current
state. However we as elements in a system would like to have that ability, and
with it the knowledge to steer a system into a state that is more advantageous
to our survival. (In some ways this was the holy grail of systems research,
the ability to make precise changes that affected system state.) Large global
complex systems are at best quasi-stable, systems come under exogenous and
endogenous influences all the time and as a consequence are never truly static.
The current state might be enough of an attractor that the quasi-stability is
relatively stable, or the system might be slowly moving through phase-space on
a trajectory of changing state. Alternatively, as would be the case for something
like a Lorenz attractor, the system might be orbiting an attractor, but have the
capacity to jump and orbit a new attractor [34]. Each representing different
states for that system. The problem however, if we take the climate system as
an example, there is nothing to guarantee that both states will supports human
life.
Climate change is potentially a good example of this. Our planet will likely
have some sort of climate for a very long time, it might just not be one which
can support life. The ever increasing quantities of CO2 in the atmosphere may
result in a state change in the climate system. That could be a slow trajectory
of ever increasing temperatures (potentially reversible), or perhaps a rapid jump
to a new state of significantly increased temperatures (potentially irreversible,
or significantly harder to reverse), a process known as hysteresis [5].
System behaviour gets even more complex when we consider that systems
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do not stand in isolation, free from interference from their environment or other
systems (their environment of other systems). They are highly connected, to the
point where with many systems it is difficult to determine the start of one and
the end of another, or the end of the system and the start of its environment[49].
For global systems there is no outside; all global systems are connected, and we
are in them. (It is often necessary, and advantageous, for researchers to draw
arbitrary boundaries around systems to have any hope of understanding their
system of study [2]. These simplifications are a requirement of tractability, but
could introduce flawed assumptions, possibly rendering the model of the system
invalid).
3 Systemic Failure
Here it is useful to consider two possible ways that a system can fail. One is
from the point of view of the system, and the other is the point of view of some
or all of the parts in the system. In the first instance a systemic failure would
describe a situation where a failure in one part of the system, or parts of the
system, propagates through the whole system resulting the disappearance of
the global system behaviour. The interacting parts can no-longer produce that
emergent global behaviour (or any other emergent behaviour), the parts are not
interacting any more. This could be due to loss of nodes from the system, or the
breakdown of the relationships between nodes. We have to be a little cautious in
how we describe this disruption to the emergent system behaviour. It is not the
same as a system changing state, it is the total loss of the systemic behaviour.
The second possibility for failure could be from the point of view of some
parts of the system. Here the system becomes hostile to some of its parts, that
might have serve consequences for those parts, but represents merely a process
of adaptation or change at the system level. These events are undoubtedly
happening all the time, particularly in natural systems. It is from our point of
view (as a part) where these changes might appear as a systemic failure. Where
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a system that we rely on appears to fail catastrophically and can no longer
perform the function on which we are dependent, but really it is carrying on in
some other state.
Propagation of failure, and therefore how systems fail, is difficult to pre-
dict [1]. A system could lose nodes (parts of the system), or numerous edges
(relationships between the parts) could be broken, and very little visible change
may occur. However, at some point the loss or breakage might get to a point
where the system’s failure stops being solely caused by external forces and starts
been driven by the internal dynamics of the system itself. The failure could then
propagate rapidly throughout the entire system [51, 53]. The 2007-8 banking
crisis could potentially have been a systemic failure of this type, parts started
to fail in isolation at first but it quickly started to look like the whole banking
system was under threat [24].
Failure can become even more unpredictable when we think in the context
of systems-of-systems. The interaction between two semi-discrete systems may
make it even more difficult to determine that a system is under threat and how
significant that threat is. It could be the breakage and losses in a different but
connected system that causes the sudden and unforeseen failure of a system that
was thought to be robust [49, 38]. We also have to consider that relationships
between systems might be the product of relationships between emergent pro-
cesses, rather than the interactions of simple elements. An intuitive example of
this would be human society, where each individual is a complex system, and
the society is a emergent property of the interactions of the individuals. This
complexity at multiple scales (both physical and temporal) makes the system
level behaviours even more difficult to predict, as they are emergent properties
of emergent relationships.
There is one further feature of complex systems that we should consider,
inertia. System inertia is where it would appear that subsequent to a shock a
system does not appear to change. This could either be because the system is
resilient to the shock, or because there is sufficient inertia in the system that the
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change does not register immediately, but it could come at some point in the
future. We should entertain the possibility that the inertia in global systems is
the reason why we are not witnessing significant changes in response to the forces
and shocks imposed by human activity. It is not because they are resilient, but
because system inertia simply means that the reaction to our action has just not
arrived yet, failure could be coming. Here it is the multiple temporal scales that
is significant, failure could be occurring on a different temporal scale to human
life. For decades the composition of the atmosphere has been changing, and for
decades very little seemed to be happening. Only now are we starting to see
the system react as average surface temperatures have started to change [36],
potentially therefore it happening at different temporal scale. We could easily
be seeing the very beginning of the reaction to our action, and that reaction
could massively accelerate in future decades.
3.1 Total Systemic Failure?
If we accept that we exist within a complex systems-of-systems, built by the
interactions between parts that produce emergent system behaviours, and that
the emergent behaviour of the supra-system is therefore an emergent property of
the interactions between subsystems. Then what can we say about whether, at
least from the point of view of human civilisation, we are likely to be confronted
with total systemic failure? Or indeed whether we are already experiencing
total systemic failure?
Real world examples of systemic failure in social, ecological, and physical
systems are thankfully historically rare, although unfortunately not historically
absent [30, 32, 31, 20]. However, this is small comfort as we do not have
to look very hard to see that numerous systems are under significant pres-
sure [18, 22, 8, 46], and understanding safe operating spaces for social-ecological
systems is non-trivial [41, 14]. How close these systems are to failure is difficult
question to address, as “we do not know exactly where to locate thresholds of
irreversibility” [19].
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One system that did at least appear to be close to systemic failure was global
finance during the crash of 2008, where according to media reports banks in the
UK were perhaps only hours away from switching off the cash machines. The
experience of the financial and banking sector during the financial crisis allows
us to make a number of important points and draw a number of comparisons.
The crash of 2008 was an unexpected systemic crisis, that was at least in part
due to the connectivity of the system and a lack of understanding of how the
parts were interacting. There was a global response to the crisis, and the world
mobilised very quickly in response to the existential risk of financial catastrophe,
with large bail-outs and other forms of liquidity being provided to the sector.
An exact total cost of the financial crisis would be difficult to calculate, however
the reported total EU bailouts of member states is approximately e544 billion
(from successive rounds of financial support [17]). The UK National Audit Office
reports that peak support for UK banks was around UK£1.162 trillion [39], the
US treasury’s Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 provided US$700
billion to banks [15], and the Chinese economic stimulus program was reported
to be US$586 billion [4]. In addition there has been successive rounds of quan-
titative easing in the US, UK, Japan, and Sweden. Was this the best response
to the crisis? Perhaps not, and it could be argued that the financial system
has not fully recovered, and we do not know what might be coming in the fu-
ture. Had we had a better understanding of global finance as a complex system,
then (assuming that the crisis was not simply avoided) perhaps a more targeted
response could have been made.
What is also interesting about the response to an existential risk to the
financial system is that there was in fact a global response, with similar tools
being deployed by multiple nations together. It has also been noted that bailouts
dwarf spending on other global crises [3]. This again highlights the significance
of the interactions and feedbacks between global systems. Different social and
political systems (which are tightly linked to the financial system), allowed for
the intervention in the financial system. There was resistance (from the ‘people’)
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however it was not enough to stop the response (or change its nature) and for
better or worse the financial system was bailed out. Social and political systems
are also tightly linked to the climate system, however in this case we seem to
be struggling to respond in a coordinated way, or on a sufficient scale, and the
resistance this time seems to be more political.
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, produced for the
United Kingdom Government late in 2006, made a central recommendation
that 1% per annum of then global GDP should be spent to stabilise global
atmospheric CO2e at around 500 to 550 ppm, which was then later revised to 2%
of global GDP per annum in 2008 [45, 29]. In 2006 global GDP was reported by
the World Bank to be approximately US$51.3 trillion, rising to US$63.4 trillion
in 2008, and it currently stands at about US$75.8 trillion [52]. 2% of $70 trillion
dollars would be roughly US$1.4 trillion per year for 8 years, or about US$11.4
trillion. Not an insignificant sum of money, however not beyond what countries
could afford should ‘they’ want to, and is not that different in magnitude to
the funds provided to the financial sector. The exact comparative cost is not
the important issue, both cost calculations are fraught with difficulties because
it is not simply the case that money is spent but assets are also acquired and
economies stimulated in complex ways (its a complex system). What is an
important issue is that in the case of the financial system we were unable to
see the crisis coming, and therefore were not able to respond appropriately, and
now must hope that in the long term our intervention proves to be successful
and not actually have done more harm than good. In the case of the climate
system it would seem that in all likelihood we can see the crisis coming but are
unable to collectively respond. Our thinking is not systemic.
At present we do not have the tools (computational or otherwise), language,
or understanding to address this problem of knowing how and when a system
is going to react. Our ability to even map complex systems, particularly in the
real world, is limited, and the holy grail of complexity science of being able
to then make precise interventions that produce predictable changes remains
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elusive [9, 2]. It might even be the case that the level of precision dreamt
of is impossible; there are no levers to pull. We should also be mindful that
intervention might also have its own unintended consequences, knowing when
not to act because a system is in the process of adapting is as important. What
therefore can we do?
4 Complex Networks and Artificial Intelligence
Complex networks are an intuitive method by which complex systems can be
characterised and perhaps understood. Networks are made up of nodes that
often represent objects, such as a bank, or person. Edges (connections) between
the nodes capture some relationship between the two objects; Bank A owes
money to Bank B, Alice is friends with Bob, Bob owes money to Bank B. For
this reason complexity theory maps well onto complex networks [37].
Network structure, as defined by connections between the nodes, tells us
something about that system, e.g. friendship groups (communities) or infor-
mation flow. These regions (along with other warning signals[42, 43]) might
provide a way of characterising the state of a system. Different network struc-
tures could be associated with stability, or with instability. Others still might
map to regions of structural dependency, and/or the propensity for failure. This
is not a precise lever of change, but more a way of assessing the health of a sys-
tem, and providing some indication of where we might intervene. Thus perhaps
complex networks present an approach to modelling the Anthropocene [35, 48].
Networks of global systems could be built, and models developed to highlight
areas of potential concern, computer modelling could then be used to simulate
what could happen to these systems in the future.
Mapping and then analysing systems, particularly those on a global scale,
is a significant challenge. The analysis of dynamic networks, where nodes and
edges come and go, is particularly challenging as it is difficult to robustly attach
significance to any one node or edge, or predict if any given node or edge might
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disappear or new one form [40]. Not only the network structure (topology) is
of significance, but also the character of the components and how the network
changes. The increasing capacity in artificial intelligence (AI) and computing
power presents itself as an opportunity. Perhaps AI could be used to design the
sensory networks, and build the appropriately abstracted models required to
monitor and analyse global systems. We ourselves might struggle to determine
the significant of connectivity in systems, however we might be successful in
designing AIs that can.
5 Conclusions
Complexity, although not a new idea, perhaps offers both theory and method
required to tackle the global problems of today. This paper is not an exhaustive
discussion of the possible role of, and problems posed by, systems thinking. It
seeks to highlight that complexity theory and complex networks could contribute
to the solution, as both methods are aimed squarely at attempting to aid our
understanding of systems composed of many interacting parts. The holy grail
of complexity theory, an ability to determine which parts of a system should
be altered to produce the desired systemic change, might not be impossible.
However, complex networks might allow us to assess global systems as a systemic
whole, rather than discrete parts, and AI could be used to assist with the design
of the models to test hypotheses, and the analysis and collection of sensory data.
The possibility of the human civilisation undergoing systemic failure is not
new, ideas such as the limits of growth and sustainable development have been
discussed at least since the 1970s [16]. The central problem with this debate
seems to be around whether or not human activity is having a significant impact
on global systems. The idea that our environment is composed of isolated,
discrete systems, that do not influence each other needs to be abandoned. From
a complex systems perspective it simply makes no sense that our presence and
activity is not impacting all global systems. The question should be to what
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degree are these systems connected, what feedbacks exist, and where is human
activity creating the most pressure. Ultimately, we should seek to understand
how global systems might fail, what systemic failure might look like in the real
world, and how close systems are to failure.
Unfortunately that does not seem to be happening. The nature of our re-
spond to the possibility of a given systemic failure would appear to be more
dependant on ideology than systemic thinking, and in the case of climate change
this could prove catastrophic. The possibility of severe changes in our climate
should not be dismissed as ‘fake news’, a hoax, or conspiracies against economic
development, and the fact that it is could prove to be a contributing factor in
the failure of the climate system. From the point of view of a systemic response
to the possibility of climate change, the paralysis in the political system could
constitute a systems failure in its own right. A failure in the political system
would feedback into the climate system. Could that result in a cascade failure
of both systems?
To mitigate the possibility of total systemic failure regional interests would
need to give way to global interest, and we would need to mobilise a response
greater and even more coordinated than our response to the possible failure
of the financial sector in 2008. The question is how? Such a response looks
increasingly less likely, particularly in a world of increasing isolationism, self-
interest, and social and media echo chambers. Global complex systems do not
respect borders, making it hard to see how any state or group could act alone.
Perhaps then we need to think more in terms of distributed interventions in
systems, rather than top-down global regulation. Natural systems do not have
centralised control systems, the control is decentralised and is in fact an emer-
gent property of the interaction of the parts of the system. With gridlock
and division in global politics [25], perhaps numerous adaptive, decentralised,
smaller interventions (supported by data collection, modelling, and AI) offer
a solution where no global consensus is forthcoming. If we can make creative
use of technologies, such as sensory networks supported or designed by AI, lo-
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cally deployed but globally linked, perhaps this could support a decentralised
response to global systemic issues.
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